Identifying Super-precedents in an Era of Human Rights by Samar, Vincent J.
Pace Law Review 
Volume 41 Issue 2 Article 1 
August 2021 
Identifying Super-precedents in an Era of Human Rights 
Vincent J. Samar 
Loyola University Chicago Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Vincent J. Samar, Identifying Super-precedents in an Era of Human Rights, 41 Pace L. Rev. 1 
(2021) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more 
information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu. 
 
1 
IDENTIFYING SUPER-PRECEDENTS IN AN ERA OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Vincent J. Samar* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 2 
II.  THE ROLE OF STARE DECISIS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
SYSTEM ............................................................................... 3 
III.  HOW SUPER-PRECEDENTS ARE CURRENTLY IDENTIFIED, 
WHAT STABILITY DO THEY OFFER, AND WHAT ARE 
THEIR LIMITS? .................................................................... 8 
IV.  WHAT IS THE ROLE OF FREEDOM AND WELL-BEING IN 
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ETHOS? ....................... 15 
V.  SUPER-PRECEDENTS AS A WAY TO PROTECT HUMAN 
RIGHTS BY ASSIGNING VALUE TO SUPREME COURT 
PRECEDENTS ..................................................................... 27 
VI.  ABORTION, SODOMY, AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE ................ 35 
a.  Abortion ....................................................................... 35 
b.  Sodomy ........................................................................ 42 
c.  Same-Sex Marriage ..................................................... 50 




 This Article discusses what a “super-precedent” is in 
American Constitutional Law.  Additionally, it describes the 
current criteria used to identify super-precedents and the 
limitations of these criteria.  It then mentions the various 
precedents that have been afforded this august title and suggests 
the need for an additional criterion to ensure the continued 
protection of those precedents most closely associated with the 
protection of human rights.  Finally, the article identifies three 
additional precedents, beyond those usually recognized, that 
ought to be ranked super-precedents and provides a basis for 
ranking all precedents, grounded in autonomy, when they either 
conflict with one another or encounter a compelling state interest. 
 
 
* Vincent J. Samar is Lecturer in Philosophy at Loyola University Chicago, 
Associate Faculty in the Graduate School, and Adjunct Professor of Law at 
Loyola University Chicago Law School. 
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  I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent stare decisis scholarship has discussed why certain 
precedents of the United States Supreme Court have more 
staying power than others.  Those precedents are currently 
identified by how persuasive the current Justices of the Supreme 
Court, other government officials who carry out the decisions, 
and the public at large find these decisions.  The label “super-
precedent” has been applied to those opinions identified using 
the above criteria. Yet there is still much controversy as to which 
precedents fit the above criteria and whether the criteria 
themselves are too narrow and thus incapable of being 
persuasive over time.  This article acknowledges the relevance 
of the current criteria to decide whether a past precedent ought 
to be labeled a “super-precedent” or a “super-duper precedent.”  
What follows is a discussion on what is necessary before a 
precedent should receive such a lofty title—both to avoid 
potential political dueling among Supreme Court Justices, and 
more importantly, to ensure that important precedents will be 
sustained, not so much by their current political acceptability, 
which can be in flux at any moment, but by how well they serve 
to protect basic human rights in perpetuity. 
What is at stake is not just whether the precedent should 
carry weight when the Court decides future cases, but also, how 
much weight it carries.  For example, should a future Supreme 
Court decision be allowed to diminish the authority of a prior 
precedent in a subject matter area?  If so, ought there to be any 
limits to what extent the precedent can be diminished?  This 
article intends to show that an additional requirement is needed 
to avoid important human rights precedents from being too 
easily overruled or distinguished, and to identify which past 
precedents are worthy of sustained respect.  That additional 
requirement should invoke a sliding scale for determining the 
authoritativeness of any precedent from the weakest to 
strongest.  One caveat: the additional requirement proposed 
here is not meant to undermine other relevant criteria currently 
being relied upon in determining the importance of past 
precedents.  Rather, it is to establish a further basis—one 
outside conventional politics—for determining the weight of a 
precedent. 
Section Two will discuss how respect for precedent, 
otherwise known as stare decisis, operates in American courts 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/1
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generally, including how it may prevent new decisions of state 
and federal courts from veering too far from previous holdings.  
It will distinguish vertical stare decisis from horizontal stare 
decisis and compare the limited strength horizontal stare decisis 
provides to preserving past precedents against vertical stare 
decisis, which effectively governs lower court decisions.  While 
the focus will be mostly on U.S. Supreme Court cases, it should 
be noted that the horizontal role of precedent also applies to 
state supreme court decisions concerning state law. 
Section Three will discuss how super-precedents are 
currently identified, which Supreme Court precedents have been 
identified as such, what stability they offer, and what limits 
might still apply even when a precedent is identified as a “super-
precedent.” 
Section Four will discuss the role of freedom and well-being 
in normative democratic theory and as an ideal for recognizing 
human rights in the American constitutional ethos.  It will then 
apply aspects of that theory to justify the important 
constitutional role for the Supreme Court in protecting 
fundamental rights and equality. 
Section Five will show how a commitment to stare decisis in 
certain areas serves to protect human rights generally by 
providing a way to determine which constitutional precedents 
are most worthy of long-standing security. 
Finally, Section Six will identify three additional super-
precedents which should be acknowledged because of their 
central importance to protecting individual freedom, along with 
well-being and equality. 
II.  THE ROLE OF STARE DECISIS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 
 
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the Latin phrase 
“stare decisis” means “[t]o stand by decided cases; to uphold 
precedents; to maintain former adjudications.”1  Stare decisis 
presents “[a] strong judicial policy that the determination of a 
point of law by a court will generally be followed by a court of the 
same or lower rank . . . .”2  In a law review article by—then 
 
1. Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910). 
2. Stare Decisis, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969). 
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Professor now Justice—Amy Coney Barrett, she points out that 
stare decisis “originated in common law courts” and has since 
become a fixture in U.S. federal courts.3  “[T]he strength of stare 
decisis is context dependent.”4  Stare decisis has two distinct 
forms: vertical and horizontal.5  An example of vertical stare 
decisis is when a state or federal appellate court’s holding on a 
point of law governs lower court decisions in future cases.  
“Horizontal stare decisis, by contrast, is a shape-shifting 
doctrine” that “is virtually nonexistent in district courts” but 
prohibits “one panel [in a federal circuit court] from overruling 
another, allowing only the rarely seated en banc court to 
overrule precedent.”6  Justice Barrett notes that at the U.S 
Supreme Court level, stare decisis refers to three categories of 
precedent.  “Statutory precedents receive ‘superstrong’ stare 
decisis effect, common law cases receive medium-strength stare 
decisis effect, and constitutional cases are the easiest to 
overrule.”7 
Under this formulation, a question arises concerning the 
ongoing reliability of Supreme Court precedents founded upon 
past constitutional determinations.  It appears that Justices who 
may have previously dissented or who have since changed their 
mind, or are newly installed but disagree with a prior decision, 
may now have the opportunity to overrule precedents with 
which they disagree, as long as they can form a majority.  Such 
an approach may seem reasonable, as it does not bind the Court 
to past cases that presently appear to have been wrongly 
decided.  On the other hand, if there are no limits on which 
precedents the Court will follow, other than which view of a prior 
holding may be favored by today’s Justices, a question arises 
concerning the Court’s legitimacy to operate as a nonpartisan 
branch of government.  This is especially concerning to the co-
equal nature of the three branches of Government, as the Court 
can judicially review and strike down based on constitutionality, 
acts adopted by Congress or actions taken by the president. 
Justice Barrett acknowledges this problem by noting its 
 
3. Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91 
TEX. L. REV. 1711, 1712 (2013). 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 1712–13. 
7. Id. at 1713. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/1
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potential to undermine doctrines such as judicial restraint, the 
rule of law, and the legitimacy of judicial review.8  Indeed, she 
acknowledges that precedent should give the Justices pause 
when deciding whether to overrule a prior case holding but does 
not say how much pause.  Paraphrasing a dissent by the late 
Justice Brandeis, she writes, a Justice who thinks differently 
from what a former Court ruled must decide “whether it is better 
for the law to be settled or settled right.”9  That concern is 
certainly important, but when stated without further criteria as 
to how the decision is to be made, it leaves every precedent open 
to a current Court’s willingness to overrule it. 
Here, it might be questioned what it means for a case to be 
“settled right,” let alone how much salience should be afforded 
such a determination.  Presumably, any forward-looking 
analysis must consider internally not just whether the original 
case decision was proper when decided, but also how other cases 
that were subsequently decided have either followed from it or 
relied upon it.10  This suggests that what is right is actually a 
much more complicated matter.  For, in the first instance, it 
requires not that the original case be free of later interpretative 
criticisms, but also to be balanced against how the jurisprudence 
in the area has since developed in light of the original holding.  
For example, according to Ronald Dworkin, constitutional 
originalists will tend to follow one of two methodological 
approaches.  “Semantic originalists” will pay close attention to 
the language the framers adopted in writing the Constitution, 
while “expectation originalists” are more concerned with what 
the framers likely thought would be the consequences of their 
 
8. Id. at 1715. 
9. Id. at 1714 (citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, 
because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be 
settled than that it be settled right.”). 
10. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992), the Court undertook a reexamination of the principles in Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which upheld a woman’s right to an abortion, 
and whether the central holding in Roe that protected a woman’s right to 
choose should be overruled.  Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, 
reaffirmed the Court’s earlier holding that afforded a woman’s right to choose, 
noting that “the Court's judgment is informed by a series of prudential and 
pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling the 
holding with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs of 
reaffirming and overruling.”  Casey, 505 U.S. at 834.  For the considerations 
adopted by Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion, see infra Section Three. 
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writing.11  On this reading, Dworkin places Justice Scalia’s 
writings on the Eighth Amendment and its application to death 
penalty cases in the latter camp.12  Should the decision in a prior 
case be interpreted according to the language adopted by the 
framers to state what the Constitution means, even though it 
may now encompass a far greater set of possibilities than might 
have been thought when the decision was actually adopted?  Or 
should the language be confined to only what the framers likely 
expected it to include given their historical and social 
circumstances?  Obviously, much of settled law could be affected 
if the expectation approach is followed, especially in regard to 
where the framers chose to use abstract, rather than concrete, 
language, most likely to signal their agreement that the law 
would continue to evolve. 
Thus, this dual division of originalism leaves any decision, 
based on what the framers may have expected, open to the 
charge that the constitutional language should stand on its own, 
irrespective of the background legal context in which it was 
written.  Additionally, expectation originalism runs the threat of 
too closely searching out a context that will likely straitjacket 
future generations into making use of the language the framers 
adopted when deciding novel issues the framers could not have 
imagined.  Was the framers’ choice to use abstract language at 
times, like with “cruel and unusual punishments” in the Eighth 
Amendment or “due process” in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, meant to signal they foresaw a constitution that 
should evolve over time with society’s changing understanding 
of its own political morality?  Or are such questions to be decided 
by what was commonly understood at the time they wrote these 
words?  If so, why did the framers not make clear that was their 
intention?  After all, they could have restricted their choice of 
language to be far more concrete, as they did in Article II when 
they specified that the President be “a natural born Citizen, or a 
Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this 
Constitution . . . [and] have attained to the Age of thirty-five 
Years, and been fourteen Years a resident within the United 
States.”13 
 
11. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 119 (1997). 
12. Id. at 120. 
13. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/1
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An alternative to the so-called “originalist” position is the 
“Living Constitution” approach, which would seek to treat 
constitutional interpretation even more broadly as an evolving 
understanding, capable of meeting changing needs and 
circumstances as they arise.  Here, a deeper understanding of 
human psychology, the environment, the growth of international 
and domestic norms, both political and economic, not to mention 
the development of a far more interdependent world where the 
political and economic actions of one country will likely affect the 
material well-being of other countries, all can be taken into 
account.14  An obvious problem with this approach is that it 
leaves the document open to changes in meaning the framers not 
only may never have even imagined, but which, for some, would 
appear to make the Court into an unelected super legislature.15  
Clearly at stake, with both points of view, is how the 
Constitution can continue to have authority in the present time, 
unless that authority can be found to support needed changes in 
our thinking about the role of government in the modern world. 
Are there certain “human” rights, for example, not 
specifically enumerated in the Constitution, that the 
Constitution could nevertheless be interpreted to defend, 
regardless of whether they may have been expected by the 
framers?  As discussed, a proper approach to this question would 
fall between the two approaches of originalism and living 
constitutionalism; it would justify bringing international human 
rights into the discussion, with the caveat that the justification 
for including such rights is at the apex when it extends existing 
constitutional norms, even if by adding significantly to them.16  
For example, the Court has interpreted the Constitution to 
afford recognition of a right to privacy, arguably derived from 
various provisions of the Bill of Rights.17  Otherwise, there is 
 
14. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 100 (2010). 
15. See SCALIA, supra note 11, at 44. 
16. Vincent J. Samar, Rethinking Constitutional Interpretation to Affirm 
Human Rights and Dignity, 47 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 83, 121–22 (2019). 
17. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  In Griswold, 
a majority of the Court agreed this right to privacy was protected by the 
Constitution.  They disagreed over exactly where it was to be found.  Justice 
Douglas, writing for a plurality, believed it was located in the “penumbra” of 
the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.  Id. at 484.  Justice 
Goldberg believed it to reside in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of non-
enumerated rights retained by the people.  Id. at 499.  Justice Harlan would 
locate it at a place the Court would eventually agree upon in Roe v. Wade, 410 
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little justification for affirming new rights when the proposed 
rights seem far distant from anything the text can be reasonably 
thought to represent.  However there could be a strong public 
interest to amend the text or public opinion could be felt so 
strongly that it has, for all intents and purposes, already 
operated as an amendment.18  All of this is not meant to suggest 
the Supreme Court should be prohibited from overruling a past 
constitutional precedent that it no longer believes correct, but 
rather that in deciding whether to overrule a past precedent, 
various factors need be considered to protect the Court’s 
legitimacy, which itself arises from the Constitution being 
continually seen as authoritative cross-generationally. 
III.  HOW SUPER-PRECEDENTS ARE CURRENTLY IDENTIFIED, WHAT 
STABILITY DO THEY OFFER, AND WHAT ARE THEIR LIMITS? 
 
In 1992, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for the 
Supreme Court majority, in the very contentious case, Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,19 reaffirmed 
the essential holding of  Roe v. Wade,20 that the Constitution 
affords women a right to privacy to determine whether or not to 
continue a pregnancy before the fetus becomes viable.21  The 
case was contentious because four Justices dissented from the 
Court’s reaffirmation of Roe’s earlier holding that a woman has 
a constitutional right to choose whether to continue a 
pregnancy.22  As a general guide, Supreme Court cases usually 
will not undermine a past precedent (horizontal stare decisis) 
 
U.S. 113, 153 (1973), the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.  
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500.  It should be noted that the right to privacy, 
especially informational privacy, and states of affairs, are recognized by both 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the U.N. in 1948 and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  G.A. Res. 217 (III) 
A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 12, (Dec. 10, 1948); 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Dec. 19, 1966, 
1976 U.N.T.S. 171; see Right to Privacy under UDHR and ICCPR, 
PRIVACYBYTES (Oct. 24, 2017), https://privacy.sflc.in/universal/. 
18. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS, 47–50 (1991). 
19. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
20. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
21. Casey, 505 U.S. at 834. 
22. Id.  Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices Scalia, White, and 
Thomas, dissented from the Court’s holding to reaffirm Roe.  Id. at 979. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/1
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unless a present majority of the Justices are ready and willing 
to overrule that earlier holding—although they may chip away 
at how comprehensive the past precedent was in subsequent 
cases.23  This represents an internal point of view of legal 
decision-making designed to protect the legitimacy of court 
decisions.  Its value is that in a society where the law and legal 
institutions are generally perceived to be just, relying on past 
precedent prevents an easy acceptance of arguments for change 
that might make the Court appear to be overly political and 
unable to distribute justice.24 
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Casey, joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas, argued that 
the abortion decision in Roe had not been properly supported at 
the time Roe was decided because abortion was not a protected 
liberty interest under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.25  The dissenting Justices noted that nowhere in 
the Constitution was such a privacy right to be found; in fact, 
the “longstanding traditions of American society” had allowed 
states to proscribe abortions.26  In essence, these so-called 
originalist Justices were going beyond a semantic originalist 
approach by not just focusing on what the framers said, but 
looking at previous cases and what the states were allowed to do 
to decide whether a fundamental right exists.27  Justice Scalia 
even suggested that the liberty interests protected by the Due 
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are only those that 
were “protected against government interference by other rules 
of law when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.”28  His 
 
23. See John Greabe, Constitutional Connections: The Supreme Court and 
Constitutional Stare Decisis, CONCORD MONITOR (Apr. 19, 2020, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.concordmonitor.com/The-Supreme-Court-and-constitutional-
stare-decisis-33880073. 
24. VINCENT J. SAMAR, JUSTIFYING JUDGMENT: PRACTICING LAW AND 
PHILOSOPHY 76 (1998) (providing “criteria from the internal point of view for 
determining when a judge should decide a case based on traditional legal 
materials [including case precedents] and the society’s political morality and 
when she should appeal to a broader theory of natural law/natural rights”). 
25. Casey, 505 U.S. at 979–80 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
26. Id. at 980. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 981 (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110).  Justice Scalia 
argues: “The Court destroys the proposition, evidently meant to represent my 
position, that ‘liberty’ includes ‘only those practices, defined at the most specific 
level, that were protected against government interference by other rules of 
law when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified,’ ante, at 2805. That is not, 
9
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expectation originalist interpretation seemed to allow him to 
suggest that the Court should not recognize any rights that could 
not be found to be part of this “longstanding tradition.”29 
At first, Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, 
acknowledged, with the dissenters, that stare decisis was “not 
an ‘inexorable command.’”30  However, she quickly added: 
 
When this Court reexamines a prior holding, its 
judgment is customarily informed by a series of 
prudential and pragmatic considerations 
designed to test the consistency of overruling a 
 
however, what Michael H. says; it merely observes that, in defining ‘liberty,’ 
we may not disregard a specific, ‘relevant tradition protecting, or denying 
protection to, the asserted right,’ ibid. But the Court does not wish to be 
fettered by any such limitations on its preferences. The Court's statement that 
it is ‘tempting’ to acknowledge the authoritativeness of tradition in order to 
‘cur[b] the discretion of federal judges,’ ante, at 2804, is of course rhetoric 
rather than reality; no government official is ‘tempted’ to place restraints upon 
his own freedom of action, which is why Lord Acton did not say ‘Power tends 
to purify.’ The Court's temptation is in the quite opposite and more natural 
direction—towards systematically eliminating checks upon its own power; and 
it succumbs.”  Id. at 981. 
29. Id.; see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 671 (2015).  In 
Obergefell, The Supreme Court recognized that the fundamental right to 
marriage under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes 
the right of same-sex couples to marry.  Id.  The Court was clear to note the 
presence of a longstanding tradition alone will not always determine whether 
a fundamental right exists.  Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy noted 
that: “Objecting that this does not reflect an appropriate framing of the issue, 
the respondents refer to Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 721 (1997), 
which called for a “‘careful description’” of fundamental rights. They assert the 
petitioners do not seek to exercise the right to marry but rather a new and 
nonexistent “right to same-sex marriage.” Brief for Respondent in No. 14–556, 
p. 8. Glucksberg did insist that liberty under the Due Process Clause must be 
defined in a most circumscribed manner, with central reference to specific 
historical practices. Yet while that approach may have been appropriate for 
the asserted right there involved (physician-assisted suicide), it is inconsistent 
with the approach this Court has used in discussing other fundamental rights, 
including marriage and intimacy. Loving [v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)] did 
not ask about a “right to interracial marriage”; Turner [v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 
(1987)] did not ask about a “right of inmates to marry”; and Zablocki [v. 
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)] did not ask about a “right of fathers with unpaid 
child support duties to marry.”  Rather, each case inquired about the right to 
marry in its comprehensive sense, asking if there was a sufficient justification 
for excluding the relevant class from the right.  See also Glucksberg, 521 U. S., 
at 752–773 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 789–792 (BREYER, J., 
concurring in judgments).”  Id. at 671. 
30. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/1
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prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and 
to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and 
overruling a prior case.31 
 
Original intent by itself may not be sufficient.  Justice 
O’Connor then further provided various case examples where 
prudential and pragmatic tests played a role in the 
determination of whether a past precedent ought to be 
overruled.  This goes beyond what the framers may have 
expected to consider as the practical effect an overruling might 
have on what had become a well-recognized rule of law.  Justice 
O’Connor notes: 
 
Thus, for example, we may ask whether the rule 
has proven to be intolerable simply in defying 
practical workability; whether the rule is subject 
to a kind of reliance that would lend a special 
hardship to the consequences of overruling and 
add inequity to the cost of repudiation; whether 
related principles of law have so far developed as 
to have left the old rule no more than a remnant 
of abandoned doctrine; or whether facts have so 
changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to 
have robbed the old rule of significant application 
or justification.32 
 
What these tests illustrate is that in determining whether a 
past precedent should be overruled, it is not sufficient to inquire 
solely into whether the past precedent would satisfy some 
modern understanding of original intent, be it semantic or 
expectation.  This is especially true where the past precedent 
has not proved unworkable, where a significant part of the 
society (pro-choice in the case of the Roe decision) has come to 
rely upon it, and where now having to give up that reliance could 
cause undue hardship, especially when the holding has not been 
undermined by other related developments in the law. 
Ideally, where responses to these other factors support 
continuing a past precedent, it takes on greater salience against 
 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 855 (citations omitted). 
11
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being overruled than were they not present, or if they are 
present only to a slight degree.  It is thus necessary to discuss 
stare decisis not as a static doctrine, but rather as a dynamic 
doctrine capable of keeping alive precedents that remain 
meaningful in society while allowing others to die off.  Even with 
these standards in place, I would like to suggest more is needed.  
When rendering a constitutional decision, the Supreme Court is 
not merely deciding a particular case.  It is affirming its role in 
a constitutional democracy that distinguishes and affirms “the 
higher law of the people from the ordinary law of legislative 
bodies.”33  In such a situation, the Court must be able to identify, 
as Professor Ackerman has noted, when the political partisans 
of a movement have been first able to 
 
convince an extraordinary number of their fellow 
citizens to take their proposed initiative with a 
seriousness they do not accord to [normal] politics, 
after having allowed their opponents a fair 
opportunity to organize their own forces; [and still 
finding] that they have convince[d] a majority of 
their fellow Americans to support their initiative . 
. . in the deliberative forta provided for “higher 
 
33. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 233 (1993).  The specific role of the 
federal courts generally and the Supreme Court in particular in the United 
States was articulated in FEDERALIST No. 78 where Hamilton writes: “The 
interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A 
constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental 
law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the 
meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there 
should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which 
has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in 
other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention 
of the people to the intention of their agents.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 
(Alexander Hamilton).  The view expressed by Hamilton would become the 
basis for the principle of judicial review adopted by the Court in Marbury v. 
Madison, where Chief Justice Marshall writes: “It is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply 
the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. 
If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of 
each.  So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the 
constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide 
that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably 
to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of 
these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial 
duty.”  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177–78 (1803). 
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lawmaking.”34 
 
Obviously, this understanding fits the ratification of a 
constitutional amendment.  But it also fit a past Supreme Court 
precedent if the reliance were widespread and deemed to be very 
important, as Justice O’Connor suggested in Casey was true of 
Roe. 
I do not mean to suggest that momentary politics may not 
intervene to encourage a president to nominate an individual 
holding a certain view of constitutional interpretation or a 
Senate to confirm that nomination.  I do mean to suggest that a 
decision of higher lawmaking must transcend momentary 
politics about particulars and take its place on the side of 
individuals, some of whom may be in a crisis situation, who need 
to rely on what they have come to understand and expect the 
Constitution to guarantee. 
Additionally, looking to the Court rather than trying to 
adopt an amendment provides opportunity for dealing with 
crisis situations and changing circumstances while avoiding 
disputes concerning an amendment’s language or the time it 
may take for an amendment to get adopted.35  It also allows for 
the Court to try out a solution and even limit it in various ways 
that would be much harder to adjust were an amendment being 
considered.  In such a context, where higher lawmaking is 
involved, I agree with Professor Ackerman that “the Justices 
[can] no longer content themselves with salvaging fragments of 
the old regime; they [need] try to integrate new principles added 
by the last transformation [of what the society had come to agree 
upon generally] into the older tradition in a comprehensive 
way.”36 
This effort by the Court to not be confined strictly by original 
intent might further keep the Constitution authoritative cross-
generationally by allowing it to become part of a tradition that 
is itself capable of attending to important cultural, political, and 
 
34. ACKERMAN, supra note 18, at 6. 
35. See The Amendment Process: Adding a New Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, Not an Easy Task!, HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBR. & MUSEUM, 
https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/education/three-branches/amendment-process 
(last visited June 1, 2021). 
36. ACKERMAN, supra note 18, at 161. 
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economic needs in an ever changing world.37  One must consider 
whether the rights or benefits that may be affected when the 
Court overrules a previous precedent will not be easily adjusted 
or reconstructed by subsequent legislative acts.  Such 
consideration is crucial if these rights or benefits are thought 
especially important to individual well-being, which is what the 
Constitution’s preamble would seem to direct.38  All this poses 
the question: is it incumbent on the Court, as the protector of the 
higher law, to ensure that its action to overrule a past precedent 
not appear unjust or strictly a consequence of partisan politics 
to a great majority of the people likely to be affected by it?  That 
does not mean past precedents can never be reconsidered or 
distinguished.  Rather, it means that in those situations where 
justice demands a deeper level of judgment, the judgment must 
not fail to consider, or be unmitigated by, what the best 
understandings of political morality and democratic theory 
provide. 
This should be especially important where the past 
precedent is thought to protect an area of human rights that 
might otherwise be lost but for that protection.39  For this 
reason, this Article suggests the need for an additional factor for 
 
37. See Samar, supra note 16, at 103–12. 
38. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, in Order to 
form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, 
provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the 
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this 
Constitution for the United States of America.”). 
39. In Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954), 
the Supreme Court unanimously held that “in the field of public education the 
doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place,” and that segregated schools were 
“inherently unequal.”  That change, overruling the Court’s previous precedent, 
in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), that separate public facilities are 
constitutionally allowed provided they were equal for blacks and whites, 
represented a major shift in the Court’s 14th Amendment equal protection 
jurisprudence.  However, because the Court left open how desegregation would 
be accomplished, by asking for further briefs on the issue, it was not until 1955, 
in a second decision, Brown v. Board Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294, 301 
(1955), that the Court would remand future cases to the lower courts to proceed 
with desegregation “with deliberate speed.”  Even with this second ruling 
desegregation did not get accomplished until the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. 
L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964), was passed, followed by the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965, 52 U.S.C. § 10101, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604.  
Thereafter, in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), the Court ruled that 
even private, nonsectarian schools must desegregate if they are to avoid being 
in violation of federal law. 
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determining the staying power of past constitutional precedents.  
This factor will especially play a role when higher values, as may 
be thought to establish human rights generally, are involved.  
That factor is how well the precedent operates to affirm the basic 
freedom and well-being that underlies all human rights.  Such 
rights include, perhaps most especially, those civil rights and 
liberties that the Constitution, along with its subsequent 
amendments, has recognized.  Before addressing this question, 
it is necessary to address the philosophical foundation for 
human rights. 
IV.  WHAT IS THE ROLE OF FREEDOM AND WELL-BEING IN THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ETHOS? 
 
Here, I depart from the positivist school of jurisprudence 
which, early in its history, held that a law was a command 
backed by a threat issued from a sovereign to an independent 
political community.40  Later it would substitute a normative 
obligation recognized by the people for its earlier focus on fear or 
threat.41  The problem with following a positivist view is that 
obligations involving matters of human rights and political 
morality cannot be reduced to what society might prefer at any 
given moment, because oftentimes the rights claimed may be 
contrary to an individual’s real interests and a choice must be 
made.42  Likewise, we will be unsuccessful in protecting human 
rights if we try to ground them in comprehensive moral, 
religious, or metaphysical doctrines that “cannot support a 
reasonable balance of political values that all or most can 
 
40. JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURERS ON JURISPRUDENCE 90–91 (Robert Campbell 
ed., 4th ed. 1873). 
41. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 80 (3d ed. 1961). 
42. See Jules L. Coleman, The Grounds of Welfare, 112 YALE L.J. 1511, 
1542–43 (2003) (book review); see also Steven Strasnick, Individual Rights and 
the Social Good: A Choice-Theoretic Analysis, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 415, 416–17, 
428, 440 (1982) (referencing first various “conceptions of justice that defends 
the interests of the individual against those of society” including Ronald 
Dworkin’s, John Rawls’s and Robert Nozick’s, then arguing, contrary to 
Amartya Sen “that a society manifesting the properties of social choice 
analyzed in this work is fully capable of respecting individual rights in matters 
of personal preference. All that is required in addition to the formal properties 
that have been proposed is the acceptance by society of a principle akin to the 
privacy principle of entitlement.”). 
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accept.”43 
Robert George’s idea that reasonable debate can go on in 
this area where comprehensive religious, moral, or metaphysical 
doctrines are likely to dominate is itself likely to undermine any 
real possibility for consensus to form, let alone to provide 
consistent protection of human rights.44  Indeed, in a pluralistic 
society, whose members are oft to subscribe to very different 
comprehensive doctrines, George’s approach is unlikely to 
achieve anything more than a reduced form of lawmaking and 
even then only on fairly noncontroversial issues.  By contrast, 
Rawls’s idea of public reason provides a more responsive choice, 
where the only obligations a court need consider are those 
features of political justice people can unite around to form an 
overarching constitutional consensus.45  Such considerations, as 
 
43. RAWLS, supra note 33, at 253. 
44. In his article, Public Reason and Public Conflict: Abortion and 
Homosexuality, 106 YALE L.J. 2475, 2502 (1997), Robert George writes: “The 
question of one’s obligations toward fellow citizens with whom one disagrees is 
itself a moral question, indeed, a moral question which implicates, or may 
implicate, constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice such as 
questions of freedom of speech and the press, and the right to vote. Deliberation 
about one’s obligations to those who advocate policies which one believes to be 
seriously unjust will be informed by one's general or “comprehensive” views 
about justice. There is, I believe, no reason to suppose that people can or should 
attempt to prescind from their “comprehensive views” in determining their 
obligations to those with whom they find themselves in morally charged 
political conflict.”  This position he follows with: “A sound principle of public 
reason for a deliberative democracy would indeed require citizens and 
policymakers to justify their political advocacy and action by appeal to 
principles of justice and other moral principles accessible to their fellow 
citizens by virtue of their “common human reason.” It would, however, exclude 
no reasonable view in advance of its dialectical consideration “on the merits” 
in public debate. Nor would it exclude religious views as such. What it would 
exclude, rather, as grounds of public policymaking generally, are appeals to 
sheer authority (religious or otherwise) or to “secret knowledge,” or the 
putative truths revealed only to an elite (or the elect) and not available, in 
principle, to rational persons as such.  A sound principle of public reason would, 
in short, be very wide. Its goal would be the “perfectionist” one of settling law 
and public policy in accordance with what is true as a matter of justice, human 
rights, and political morality generally.”  Id. at 2504. 
45. See RAWLS, supra note 33, at 233–34 (explaining how in a 
constitutional democracy a supreme court must operate as an exemplar of 
public reason).  Rawls writes: “By applying public reason the court is to prevent 
that law from being eroded by the legislation of transient majorities, or more 
likely, by organized and well-situated narrow interests skilled at getting their 
way.  If the court assumes this role and effectively carries it out, it is incorrect 
to say that it is straight-forwardly antidemocratic.  It is indeed 
antimajoritarian with respect to ordinary law, for a court with judicial review 
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would support an individuals’ autonomy to decide for oneself 
what particular comprehensive approaches are suitable for 
living, provided they do not crossover into the realm of directly 
harming others, would seem to be the most that public reason 
can provide.  While this approach opens the door to the kind of 
consideration the Court should afford past precedents thought 
to be essential to securing human rights, it still says too little 
about how those precedents might be determined. 
Certainly, it is important for the Court to afford protection 
to its precedents which protect the basic liberties and rights set 
forth in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which otherwise could be open to challenge, not because they do 
not allow people in a society to live together, but because they 
are unlikely to be part of an overarching consensus when the 
only way consensus can be reached is by agreement over a set of 
comprehensive moral, religious, or metaphysical ideas.  
Interestingly, the two so-called super-precedents most often 
talked about, and which Justice Barrett identifies along with 
several others,46 are Brown v. Board of Education47 and 
Marbury v. Madison.48  However, these may not be good 
examples, if only because the basis for that determination is that 
presently they have achieved widespread acceptance such that 
it is highly unlikely a case will be brought to directly challenge 
their holdings.  This shows that widespread acceptance alone 
cannot be sufficient for protecting human rights if it does not 
also provide protection of individual autonomy in cases where no 
one else’s basic interests are likely to be affected.  Even this can 
 
can hold such law unconstitutional.  Nevertheless, the higher authority of the 
people supports that.  The court is not antimajoritarian with respect to higher 
law when its decisions reasonably accord with the constitution itself and with 
its amendments and politically mandated interpretations.”  Id. 
46. In addition to Brown and Marbury, Justice Barrett also identifies the 
following cases as most often spoken of as super-precedents:  Martin v. 
Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (holding that the Supreme 
Court can exercise judicial review over state court matters); Helvering v. 
Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding the constitutionality of the Social 
Security Act), the Legal Tender Cases (Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall) 457 
(1870)) (upholding the constitutionality of the government’s issuance of paper 
money), Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporates the Fourth Amendment to apply to the states), and 
the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding the Fourteenth Amendment 
applies to state action).  Barrett, supra note 3, at 1734–35. 
47. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
48. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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be problematic where the case may involve a conflict between 
autonomous claims.  Remember, the First Amendment provision 
for having no law respecting the free exercise of religion might, 
depending on how it is interpreted, allow for a religious view to 
sometimes undermine individual autonomy.49 
The point of focusing on basic interests, which often 
encompass fundamental rights like freedom of expression, 
privacy, thought, and worship, in situations where no other 
fundamental right may be at stake, is to avoid an over-inclusive 
notion of an interest that could allow any intrusion on individual 
autonomy, provided only that it was distributed fairly.  Indeed, 
it is not clear, even with respect to these poster-cases for super-
precedents, that they would survive a challenge brought about 
by a changing political majority whose preferences have become 
dominant.50  For this reason, I would want to bring into the 
aforesaid analysis a material criterion to go along with the kind 
of public reason Rawls talks about: to guarantee the precedents 
that should most be continued are those which support 
individual autonomy and well-being as a basic human right 
where no one else’s interests are harmed in the bargain.  The 
material condition along with the formal condition 
 
49. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 
138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018), the Supreme Court set aside the Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission’s cease and desist order against the baker who refused to 
make a wedding cake for a gay couple same-sex marriage because the baker 
claimed it violated his religious beliefs.  The Court’s decision, however, did not 
turn on its view of the merits of a civil rights law prohibiting public 
accommodations discrimination versus the baker’s religiously based choice to 
not fashion a wedding cake for a same-sex wedding.  Instead, the Court ruled 
against the Commission because it appeared to exhibit bias against religion.  
Id. 
50. See, e.g., Lucas Guttentag, Ongoing Court Challenges and the Future 
of Judicial Review, 21 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 51 (1998).  Moreover, one who, 
like John Finnis, adopts a natural law view of morality, see JOHN FINNIS, 
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 14–15 (1980), will likely have difficulty 
accepting the premise of Marbury v. Madison that, “[i]t is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,” if what 
the courts are deciding appears to violate natural law.  Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.  
Nor will they be likely to accept that, “[t]hose who apply the rule to particular 
cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.  If two laws conflict 
with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.”  Id.  All this 
is meant to suggest that unless morality is brought into the picture, the 
sustainability of even the most accepted of precedents cannot be assured.  Of 
course, with that said the question now becomes what morality could be 
accepted that would be capable of identifying and sustaining basic human 
rights. 
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universalizability will also provide a basis for resolving conflicts 
of rights where different interests might collide.  But first we 
need to say how human rights get justified. 
In service to this cause, this discussion will focus on the 
work of the American philosopher, Alan Gewirth, whose 
argument begins by noting that all moral and practical precepts, 
which would certainly include constitutional principles by virtue 
of being prescriptive, presuppose that the persons addressed are 
voluntary purposive agents.  As Gewirth writes: 
 
Amid the immense variety of such precepts, they 
have in common that the intention of the persons 
who set them forth is to guide, advise, or urge the 
persons to whom they are directed so that these 
latter persons will more or less fashion their 
behavior along lines indicated in the precepts.  
Hence, it is assumed that the hearers can control 
their behavior through their unforced choice so as 
to try to achieve the prescribed ends or contents, 
although they may also intentionally refrain from 
complying with the precepts.51 
 
Legal rules, principles, and rights, while it might be debated 
whether they are always grounded in moral precepts or not, 
certainly meet this criterion by way of their focus on the 
responsibility of the recipient for compliance.  Indeed, Gewirth 
even implies this when he goes on to state: 
 
From this it follows that action, in the strict sense 
that is relevant to moral and other practical 
precepts, has two interrelated generic features: 
voluntariness or freedom and purposiveness or 
intentionality.  By an action being voluntary or 
free I mean that its performance is under the 
agent’s control in that he unforcedly chooses to act 
as he does, knowing the relevant proximate 
circumstances of his action.  By an action being 
purposive or intentional I mean that the agent 
acts for some end or purpose that constitutes his 
 
51. ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 26–27 (1978). 
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reason for acting; this purpose may consist in the 
action itself or in something to be achieved by the 
action.  Voluntariness and purposiveness hence 
comprise. . .the generic features of action, since 
they are the most general features distinctively 
characteristic of the whole genus of action, where 
‘action’ consists in all the possible objects of moral 
and other practical precepts in the respects just 
indicated.52 
 
From this foundation in human action, Gewirth believes he 
can derive, by way of a dialectically sound method, a supreme 
principle of morality capable of providing a universal grounding 
for human rights to freedom and well-being and capable of 
resolving conflicts of rights when such conflicts occur.  Such a 
grounding in human action would be logically prior, in the 
scheme of justification, to any court precedent affording 
constitutional recognition of a more particular right since it 
would not presuppose any legal tradition to already be in place. 
More importantly, it would afford a basis for claiming that 
those constitutional precedents logically connected to protecting 
human rights, because they are designed to secure individual 
freedom and well-being, should be afforded higher value in 
comparison to other precedents more distantly removed from the 
protection of human rights.  Put another way, Gewirth believes 
that such intermediate moral principles as might be found in a 
constitution or bill of rights logically share with more general 
human rights principles a common foundation in human action 
as voluntary and purposive.  When these principles are directed 
toward securing individual freedom and well-being for all people 
on the most important of human affairs, they are properly 
designated human rights principles and should bear the same 
weight of importance as other human rights principles.  So how 
does Gewirth attempt to justify the supreme principle of 
morality capable of protecting human rights? 
Gewirth commences his dialectical argument for 
establishing his supreme moral principle from the internal point 
of view of an agent who acknowledges, “I do X for purpose E.”53  
 
52. Id. at 27. 
53. Id. at 49. 
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As an agent would not do an act she thought was bad in every 
respect, she must simultaneously acknowledge “E is good,” 
whereby “good” may be no more than a pro-attitude or reason to 
perform the action.54  From this position, the agent also 
acknowledges her freedom and well-being are necessary goods.55  
This is required because without freedom and well-being, the 
agent could not act for any purpose she thought was good.  A 
final step at this first tier of the argument is when the agent 
ultimately concludes, “I have rights to freedom and well-
being.”56 
This latter step comes about because if the agent were to 
deny she had rights to freedom and well-being, she would also 
have to deny “[a]ll other persons ought at least to refrain from 
interfering with my freedom and well-being.”57  That means she 
would have to acknowledge, from her own internal conative 
standpoint, “[i]t is not the case that all other persons ought at 
least to refrain from interfering with my freedom and well-
being.”58  Put another way, she “accepts that it is permissible 
that other persons interfere with or remove [her] freedom and 
well-being.”59  This latter statement, when affirmed from the 
agent’s own point of view, contradicts “[m]y freedom and well-
being are necessary goods,” and is inconsistent within her 
viewpoint.60  Thus, the agent, knowing she must have freedom 
and well-being to do any action she regards as worth doing must 
also know that by acting she claims rights to freedom and well-
being.  Additionally, the agent must claim that she has rights to 
freedom and well-being or be “caught in a contradiction.”61 
The above argument of the agent, when viewed by itself, 
would only establish that a rational agent seeking to do X for her 
own purposes would have to claim rights to freedom and well-
being to be logically consistent with her doing X for purpose E.  
It does not establish that others would morally have to recognize 
those rights or claim the same rights for themselves.  To move 
 
54. Id. at 49–52. 
55. See id. at 52–54. 
56. Id. at 65. 
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from an egoist or prudential rights claim to a truly moral rights 
claim that presumably all people would be obligated to abide by, 
and not just those living under a certain form of government, 
two additional factors need to be brought into the mix.  First, the 
sole basis or sufficient reason upon which the agent made her 
rights claim was that she sought to do X for purpose E; no more 
particular or identifying factor was involved that might 
otherwise single out the agent for special treatment.62  Second, 
any agent who seeks to do X for purpose E could make this same 
claim.63  This is where the universality of rights becomes most 
apparent. Thus, if the agent were to deny rights to other agents 
that on the same basis she affirms for herself, she would 
contradict herself.64  As a result of this second tier analysis, 
Gewirth concludes that every agent is logically committed to a 
supreme principle of morality that he calls the “Principle of 
Generic Consistency” (“PGC”), which states: “Act in accord with 
the generic rights [to freedom and well-being] of your recipients 
as well as yourself.”65  This is the point at which American 
constitutional law can be seen to be in agreement with both the 
agent’s claim to her own freedom and well-being, and also her 
necessary acknowledgement of the equal rights of all other 
persons to the same freedom and well-being.66 The various 
 
62. Id. at 127. 
63. See id. at 133. 
64. See id. at 133. 
65. Id. at 135. 
66. The First Amendment protects freedom of speech, free exercise of 
religion, right to a free press; the Second Amendment protects the right to own 
a firearm; the Third Amendment prohibits the state from quartering soldiers 
in times of war; the Fourth Amendment protects the privacy of persons’, 
papers, houses, and effects from governmental searches and seizures absent 
there being probable cause of a crime; the Fifth Amendment protects against 
double jeopardy, affords the right to cross-examine witnesses at a criminal 
trial, due process, and requires just compensation for the taking of property; 
the Sixth amendment provides that all criminal cases be speedy and in public 
trial, before an impartial jury, to be informed of the accusations against one, 
to be able to confront unfavorable witnesses and have compulsory process for 
obtaining favorable witnesses; the Seventh Amendment guarantees the right 
to trial by jury when the amount in controversy exceeds twenty dollars  before 
one can be convicted of a crime; the Eighth Amendment protects against 
excessive fines and “cruel and unusual punishments”; the Ninth Amendment 
acknowledges the possibility of non-enumerated rights “retained by the 
people”; the Tenth Amendment acknowledges powers that have not been 
delegated to the federal government continue in the states and the people.  U.S. 
CONST. amends. I–X.  Together, these constitutional principles protect against 
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provisions of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment 
already support many important freedoms and provide support 
for, at least, some well-being for all persons living in America.  
That is, at least in part, due to the fact that these amendments 
are widely considered to represent a moral reading of the 
Constitution’s background human rights principles.67 
Additionally, it is worth noting for completeness, that since 
every agent could have gone through the process Gewirth lays 
out, the PGC need not be thought only to bind dialectically 
specific agents engaged in the thought process, but can apply 
universally to all human agents as an assertoric moral truth.68  
Additionally, because the rights being claimed are not limited to 
only actions the agent seeks to be free from, but also consists of 
positive claims she seeks to be free to act upon, the result is a 
universal principle that affords a basis for asserting positive as 
well as negative rights claims.69  In all instances, the rights 
claims that emerge must support human freedom and well-being 
 
governmental intrusion while also providing much individual freedom and 
well-being as might be thought would be claimed by persons seeking to do X 
for purpose E.  I would add the Fourteenth amendment guarantees these same 
rights to apply against state governments and further guarantees “equal 
protection of the laws.”  Id. amend. XIV; see Incorporation Doctrine, LEGAL 
INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/incorporation_doctrine (last 
visited May 11, 2021). 
67. See Ronald Dworkin, The Moral Reading of the Constitution, N.Y REV. 
(Mar. 21, 1996), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1996/03/21/the-moral-
reading-of-the-constitution/. 
68. See GEWIRTH, supra note 51, at 152–54. 
69. As Deryck Beyleveld points out: “That the generic rights are positive 
as well as negative follows from the fact that the dialectically necessary 
argument is driven by an agent’s categorical instrumental need for the generic 
conditions of agency.  To ensure that this need is satisfied it is as necessary for 
Albert to be assisted in defending his generic conditions of agency when he 
cannot do so by his own unaided efforts as it is necessary for him not to be 
deprived of these conditions by others.  Hence, the dialectical necessity of the 
PGC not only requires agents (negatively) not to interfere with the generic 
conditions of agency of others but (positively) requires them to assist needy 
agents to secure these conditions when they are able to do so.  This requirement 
is, however, subject to the proviso that positive action to protect Albert’s 
generic conditions of agency cannot be required of Brenda (assuming it falls to 
her to provide assistance) if her assistance conflicts with comparable or more 
important generic conditions of agency of Brenda.  For reasons beyond the 
scope of this article, the discharge of many positive duties falls primarily on 
states and institutions, as representatives of collectivities of individuals, 
rather than directly upon individuals.”  Deryck Beyleveld, The Principle of 
Generic Consistency as the Supreme Principle of Human Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. 
REV. 1, 14 (2012); see ALAN GEWIRTH, THE COMMUNITY OF RIGHTS 4 (1996). 
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for all people.  Thus, the list of rights that emerge on the freedom 
side are those needed to protect human freedom.  They include 
expression, thought, worship, personal autonomy, privacy, and 
some sexual conduct, as several Supreme Court cases 
interpreting the Constitution and Bill of Rights already 
support.70 
On the well-being side, a more diagnostic approach is 
needed because different forms of well-being will affect 
purposiveness to varying degrees.71  Thus, basic well-being must 
include life, physical integrity, and mental equilibriums.72  This 
is then followed by non-subtractive well-being to prevent loss or 
reduction of purposive fulfillment as might occur by being lied 
to, cheated, or defrauded.73  Finally, additive well-being is 
brought into the mix to enhance one’s level of purposive 
fulfillment as would exist by the presence of adequate health 
care, along with education and a decent standard of living.74  By 
way of an obvious analogy, these two sets of standards for 
human rights, namely, freedom and well-being, can be found in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,75 and respectively 
in the subsequent International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,76 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights,77 among others treaties.78  They also 
 
70. GEWIRTH, supra note 51, at 256. 
71. See id. at 62–63 
72. See id. at 63. 
73. See id. at 230–31. 
74. See id. at 240–41. 
75. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (Dec. 
10, 1948). 
76. Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 1976 
U.N.T.S. 171. 
77. Int’l Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 
1976 U.N.T.S. 3. 
78. See, e.g., Slavery Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, 60 U.N.T.S. 253, as 
amended by Protocol Amending Slavery Convention, Dec. 7, 1953, 182 
U.N.T.S. 1951; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; Convention on Decent Work for 
Domestic Workers, June 16, 2011, ILO No. 189; Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 
U.N.T.S. 267, 6 I.L.M. 78; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 350 (CERD); G.A. Res. 
3068 (XXVIII), Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime 
of Apartheid (Nov. 30, 1973); Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; G.A. Res. 54/263, Optional Protocol to the Convention 
24https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/1
2021 IDENTIFYING SUPER-PRECEDENTS 25 
comport with many of the liberties either enumerated in our Bill 
of Rights or interpreted by the Court to follow from it.79 
Also important, is that conflicts of rights can now be settled 
by whether they comport with the PGC’s protection of purpose 
fulfillment.  In cases where one uses one’s freedom to deny 
another basic well-being a transactional inconsistency arises, 
and a court can restrict the use to ensure equal rights for all.80 
This is necessary to maintain the balance of ensuring equal 
human rights. More likely will be the case where differences in 
well-being are implicated, in which case basic well-being 
overrides non-subtractive well-being which overrides additive 
well-being.81  But note that this does not mean that a level of 
non-subtractive well-being based on an inequality will be judged 
superior to an important additive opportunity that would offset 
the inequality.  In such circumstances, the alleged non-
subtractive intrusion is already compromised by the inequality 
upon which it is based.  Thus, a court should properly decide the 
case in favor of the additive opportunity to offset the inequality 
already present. 
Turning back to the question of constitutional precedents, 
we can now say how the material element of well-being aids in 
deciding how strong a precedent is by how well it supports the 
freedom or well-being of those affected by it.  Obviously, 
precedents that strongly support individual autonomy 
understood as self-rule, especially where no other basic interest 
is involved, should be afforded the strongest protection; they 
 
on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 
2173 U.N.T.S. 222 (May 25, 2000); G.A. Res. 54/263, Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child 
Prostitution and Child Pornography, (May 25, 2000); Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 
1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (CEDAW); G.A. Res. 39/46 (XXXIX) annex, Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (Dec. 10, 1984), as modified, 24 
I.L.M. 535 (Oct. 23, 1985); Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3 (US signed but not ratified); 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, Dec. 20, 2006, 2716 U.N.T.S. 3. 
79. See RAWLS, supra note 33, at 233–34; GEWIRTH, supra note 51, at 127. 
80. See Alan Gewirth, The Basis and Content of Human Rights, in NOMOS 
XXIII: HUMAN RIGHTS (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1981), 
reprinted in ALAN GEWIRTH, HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS ON JUSTIFICATION AND 
APPLICATIONS 58 (1982). 
81. Id. at 55–56. 
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represent the ideal case examples of where autonomy is to be 
valued.82  On the other hand, precedents that unnecessarily 
hinder another’s autonomy (as, e.g., would occur by 
quarantining someone with HIV disease but perhaps be alright 
to quarantine someone with the Covid-19 virus) overshoot what 
is necessary to protect overall autonomy because they are not 
narrowly drawn.  In such cases, because of the way each disease 
spreads, the state’s interest to protect the health and safety of 
all the people must be weighed against the effect the particular 
method for doing so is likely to have on autonomy overall.83  
Where the solution to the problem is limited to only what is 
necessary to protect autonomy overall, like using a quarantine 
to limit the spread of a lethal airborne virus (like the Covid-19 
virus), the method serves a compelling interest that is narrowly 
drawn.84  The same would not be true for HIV disease, which 
spreads only in limited ways people can be advised to protect 
against.85  In both cases, the limitation should be the minimum 
necessary to achieve the compelling interest.86  Or, if two 
competing interests are both likely to support autonomy, but 
still conflict (like in instances where a right to privacy conflicts 
with a defendant’s right to cross-examine witnesses at trial), the 
precedent which supports maximal autonomy for all people 
should be followed.87 
 
82. Gewirth’s focus is on freedom and well-being.  Whether one agrees 
with the final steps in Gewirth’s argument to the PGC (this author does), there 
can be little doubt of his prior conclusion that every rational agent from his 
own point of view will claim rights to freedom and well-being.  That should be 
enough when operating in a liberal democracy to engage limitations so 
individuals do not try to manipulate the system to deny fundamental human 
rights to others that have already been recognized but with which they may 
disagree.  See VINCENT J. SAMAR, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 205–07 (1991) (arguing that autonomy as a fundamental 
end of democratic government “must be a basic requirement of morality or, if 
not, then at least accepted as such in the tradition and culture of the society in 
which it is to operate”). 
83. Id. at 112. 
84. Id. at 112–13; see How Covid-19 Can Spread by Airborne 
Transmission, WEILL CORNELL MED. (Oct. 8, 2020), 
https://weillcornell.org/news/how-covid-19-can-spread-by-airborne-
transmission. 
85. HIV Transmission, CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/basics/transmission.html (last visited June 5, 2021). 
86. SAMAR, supra note 82, at 113. 
87. Id. at 104.  The conflict illustrated here is meant to be between two 
active rights.  Other concerns involving a fair trial may involve passive rights, 
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Together, these two additional criteria for determining a 
compelling state interest and resolving a conflict of rights, along 
with what constitutes a human right help should rank which 
precedents become super-precedents, as well as how any human 
rights precedent should be evaluated in particular cases of 
conflict.  They may also have application in criminal cases by 
allowing a court  to assess the damage caused when privacy, for 
example, is undermined in order to support a criminal 
investigation.88  Thus, one sees that weighing previous 
precedents first by their importance to human rights overall 
and, then, by their relationship to equally important other 
interests (which might include other human rights) that also 
support autonomy, can itself provide a material ordering for just 
how significant the precedent is, without any consideration of its 
enduring popularity politically. 
V.  SUPER-PRECEDENTS AS A WAY TO PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS BY 
ASSIGNING VALUE TO SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS 
 
Not every precedent should be maintained, especially if the 
background theory establishing the precedent itself violates 
universal human rights.  The United States Constitution, while 
making important structural changes in the way the United 
States would operate compared to the way it had operated under 
the prior Articles of Confederation, nevertheless fails as a 
human rights document.  When the Constitution was originally 
adopted in 1789 slavery was permitted,89 and women did not 
have the right to vote.90  Indeed, only white property-owning 
men were afforded rights under the Constitution.91  This pattern 
would continue until adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment 
ending slavery; and the latter adoption of the Nineteenth 
 
which do not challenge privacy.  Id. at 104–05. 
88. Id. at 105–06. 
89. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (prohibiting the federal government 
from prohibiting the importation of persons understood at the time to mean 
slaves); id. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3 (containing the Three-fifths Compromise referring 
to unemancipated African slaves). 
90. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1 (giving women the right to vote). 
91. The Founders and the Vote, LIBR. CONG., 
https://www.loc.gov/classroom-materials/elections/right-to-vote/the-founders-
and-the-vote/ (last visited May 11, 2021). 
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Amendment affording women the right to vote.  During this 
period, the Supreme Court would also decide Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, which held that black people were not intended to be 
included as American citizens under the Constitution.92  That 
holding would eventually cease to continue as a precedent not by 
any Court decision, but because it had been effectively nullified 
by passage of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.93  
Indeed, it was not until the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, initially passed to provide equal protection of the 
laws for the former slaves, that equality begins to enter the 
picture; but even then, only after a significant period of time 
were the Amendment’s protections interpreted to apply to other 
marginalized groups, including women, gays and lesbians, and 
transgendered people.94 
At the turn of the twentieth century, libertarianism was the 
dominant constitutional theory under which the Court operated.  
That theory, as opposed to a more welfare-equality approach, 
became manifest with the Court’s decision in Lochner v. New 
York, which, claiming to protect freedom of contract, struck 
down a New York statute limiting the number of hours bakers 
could work.95  Indeed, it would take another thirty years and the 
Great Depression before the Court would back-off this 
libertarian view of the Contract Clause96 to begin to allow the 
government to set regulations on industries to protect individual 
welfare, beginning with constitutionally upholding a minimum 
wage regulation for women in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.97  
That decision effectively ended the Lochner era and the Court’s 
seemingly exclusive focus on property rights. 
Perhaps it was the time period between these two events 
and what was occurring in the country with the Great 
Depression that allowed the Court the conceptual space to 
rethink and redirect its attention toward protecting other 
individual rights, as might fall under the First and Fourteenth 
 
92. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (undermining the 
human rights of African-Americans held in bondage). 
93. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV. 
94. See generally 14th Amendment, HIST. (Jan. 11, 2021), 
https://www.history.com/topics/black-history/fourteenth-amendment. 
95. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
97. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
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Amendments, such as privacy, beginning with its now famous 
footnote four in the Carolene Products case.98  This change from 
a libertarian outlook toward a more progressive welfare point of 
view is probably more related to what the country was 
demanding rather than any other concern.99  Liberty and 
equality are not true opposites.  Both arguably can coexist 
without contradiction depending on how each is defined.100  The 
Constitution itself, in its preamble, makes room for this 
possibility with its reference to “promot[ing] the general welfare” 
before “secur[ing] the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our 
Prosperity,”101 which will arguably place that document on the 
side of equality when an overzealous view of liberty is likely to 
undermine the common good. 
This section and the one preceding it provide a set of criteria 
for determining the strength and durability of Supreme Court 
precedents.  A system of stare decisis that operates horizontally 
at the Supreme Court level needs to allow for these sorts of 
criteria.  Specifically, it needs to allow for them to protect the 
Court’s legitimacy, to avoid the Court from appearing to be 
nothing more than a partisan political institution when the 
 
98. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) 
(“There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of 
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific 
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments, 
which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the 
Fourteenth.”). 
99. ACKERMAN, supra note 18, at 103–04.  Professor Bruce Ackerman has 
noted: “There is a better way to make sense of the New Deal, one that finds a 
deeper meaning in the struggle between the Roosevelt Presidency and the 
Supreme Court during the Great Depression.  Within the mythic framework of 
rediscovery, the Old Court’s challenge [coming out of Lochner] to the New Deal 
from 1932 to 1937 only revealed the arbitrary character of the interpretative 
exercise the Justices had attempted over the preceding sixty years.  
Apparently, it would have been better for the Constitution and the country if 
the Court had made it plain, from 1933 on, that Franklin Roosevelt and the 
Democratic Congress were not engaged in normal politics in demanding a New 
Deal for the American people, but were instead speaking in the authentic 
higher lawmaking accents of We the People of the United States.”  Id. 
100. See Danielle Allen, Liberty, Equality Aren’t Mutually Exclusive, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/liberty-
equality-arent-mutually-exclusive/2014/10/17/d9df36ba-55fb-11e4-809b-
8cc0a295c773_story.html; George Buskell, The ‘Freedom vs. Equality’ Debate 
Is a False Dichotomy, INCITE (Nov. 6, 2018), 
http://incitejournal.com/opinion/the-freedom-vs-equality-debate-is-a-false-
dichotomy/. 
101. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
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Justices, who are not elected and have life tenure, start 
questioning the continued validity of prior Court decisions.102  It 
is also necessary to affirm stability in the way constitutional law 
unfolds. 
Practical workability is one such prudential criterion, as 
mentioned by Justice O’Connor.103 This criterion is important 
because the Supreme Court will likely be called upon in future 
cases to render decisions that will need to operate with its earlier 
precedents.  Another criterion involves the reliance interests 
that will likely have developed as a result of the earlier 
precedent.  If society has come to expect, as the Court found in 
Casey, that women have certain rights and whole industries 
have formed around that expectation, it is disconcerting, not-to-
mention grossly unfair, to cut that reliance off at the knees.  This 
is essentially what would happen if a precedent, built on a 
reliance interest that supports human rights, is arbitrarily 
overruled.  Furthermore, such a step would only strengthen the 
public’s belief that the Court is just a political tool of whoever 
was in power when the Justices were appointed, as it is the 
president with the advice and consent of the Senate who 
appoints the Justices to the Court.104  Put another way, the 
Court would suffer a loss of its original legitimacy to be 
independent of partisan politics and to be able to think on its 
own if this became the public’s view.105 
Similarly, as has already been discussed, even wide scale 
support of the public may not protect a Supreme Court precedent 
if that is the only factor considered.  This is because it is in the 
nature of our politics for citizens to often side with those who 
share their own interests, even when it may go against the 
common interests.106  When this occurs, and the citizenry do not 
all share the same comprehensive doctrines regarding religion, 
 
102. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
103. See supra Section Three. 
104. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Says Judges Are Above Politics. It May 
Hear a Case Testing That View, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/16/us/politics/supreme-court-judges-
partisanship.html. 
105. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
106. Joshua Zeitz, Does the White Working Class Really Vote Against Its 
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morality, and metaphysics, conflicts arise and politicians will 
make use of those conflicts to champion causes they believe will 
get them elected.107  This last comment should not be surprising.  
People and organizations who hold fervent religious views and 
have the means to protect them are inclined to file appropriate 
lawsuits under the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment 
or the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.108  
This is proper because it assumes that judges who evaluate the 
views can operate neutrally in their assessment of all the 
relevant arguments.  Such neutrality can be undercut, however, 
when those who would seek a particular outcome in a case limit 
those who they vote for in an election based on a promise to only 
appoint judges who already share their particular religious 
views.109 
Consequently, it is not so clear that the Court’s practical and 
prudential concerns for a precedent’s workability, reliance, and 
expectation will be enough to protect it against a serious effort 
to undermine its legitimacy.  Out of practicality, these 
considerations should play a significant role in any review of 
past precedents before being considered for overturning.  They 
should not, by themselves, be thought sufficient to overturn any 
precedent that would arguably protect human rights.  An 
additional normative criterion should be required that is capable 
of determining whether the human rights concern is truly being 
afforded adequate consideration.  Thus, attention in the area of 
seeming human rights precedents should not focus on how 
supportive the public is of the precedent being considered for 
possible overruling, but instead focus on whether the central 
holding of the precedent affirms a human right that would 
otherwise likely not be protected to the same degree or at all, if 
the precedent were overruled.  One way to do this would be to 
ask if the precedent affords a powerful protection of the freedom 
 
107. See Americans Have Positive Views About Religion’s Role in Society, 
but Want it Out of Politics, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 15, 2019), 
https://www.pewforum.org/2019/11/15/americans-have-positive-views-about-
religions-role-in-society-but-want-it-out-of-politics/. 
108. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 
S. Ct. 1719 (2018); Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), 
cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020) (No. 19-123). 
109. See Frank Newport, Religious Identity and the 2020 Presidential 
Election, GALLUP (Aug. 14, 2020), https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-
matters/317381/religious-identity-2020-presidential-election.aspx. 
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and well-being of a particular group whose human rights are 
unlikely to be protected if the precedent were overruled.  An 
additional concern is whether the right being protected 
represents a basic interest that should stand on its own, even 
before considering institutions and the practices of the society 
that may afford it further meaning and enforcement.110  If the 
precedent protects a basic human right in the sense just 
described, it is at the apex of its strength and should be left alone 
as to its central holding.111  It is a super-precedent. 
Aspects of a precedent that support but are nevertheless 
conceptually severable from its central holding may be adjusted, 
as seen in Casey, but only to meet changing circumstances in 
light of the precedent’s workability and consistency with other 
precedents.  The central holding, of course, should be considered 
invulnerable to such change if it supports a basic human right.  
One caveat that should be noted is when people treat super-
precedents as if they were static.  The position expressed in this 
Article is more that super-precedents are at the apex of a 
gradient, where precedents are ranked in survival value based 
on how well they conform to the various criteria discussed above.  
This is illustrated most clearly by conflicts of rights cases, 
particularly if both sides are each claiming governing support 
from a different super-precedent.  If both parties claim to be 
following a super-precedent that supports human rights, then 
the Court will have to decide which precedent should govern the 
case by determining which precedent is most likely to have the 
greatest impact on individual freedom and the well-being of all 
those affected.  It should not overrule the precedent but merely 
adjust it in context to the particular case. In this sense, 
Gewirth’s PGC provides the end or goal of treating the rights of 
one’s recipients and oneself as the ultimate outcome that should 
be sought.  That will only work to resolve a conflict of rights, 
however, if the Court frames the issue to determine which 
precedent is most likely to protect the human autonomy of all as 
a fundamental value in the long run. 
 
110. For the difference between basic and derivative interests, see SAMAR, 
supra note 82, at 67–68. 
111. Elsewhere, I have argued that “international human rights [that] 
would provide a similar interpretation to what might be provided by a 
fundamental principle recognized in the United States, even though it should 
add something more, its relevance is at the apex” for being part of a 
constitutional interpretation.  Samar, supra note 16, at 121. 
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Before leaving this section, another caveat needs to be 
considered.  The precedents previously addressed in this article 
are those that prevent the government from violating the civil 
and human rights of the people, and those that afford the 
blessings of basic liberty to the people.  What about those 
precedents most associated with entitlement programs like 
Social Security,112 the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”),113 and other 
similar programs the government produces to benefit the 
people?  The Constitution provides the ability for the 
government to create such programs, either under the 
Commerce Clause or the Tax and Spend Clause.114  In many of 
these instances, the government, in establishing entitlements, 
supports important aspects of human welfare.115  Still, what 
happens if the government or any of these special programs runs 
out of money?  Or if Congress deems further taxation unfair or 
unreasonable and further raising of the National Debt too costly 
to future generations?116 
Obviously, such decisions could potentially have great 
consequences on peoples’ lives, as we saw when Congress 
discontinued the mandate under the Affordable Care Act.117  
Moreover, the Constitution places the sole power of these choices 
in the hands of Congress.118  Does this mean the courts have no 
responsibilities in such matters?  This problem arose last year 
 
112. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301–1305. 
113. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010). 
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 
567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
115. See Entitlement Programs, FED. SAFETY NET, 
http://federalsafetynet.com/entitlement-programs.html (last visited May 11, 
2021). 
116. See Social Security and Health Care Entitlement Reform, HERITAGE 
FOUND. (May 20, 2019), https://www.heritage.org/blueprint-balance/policy-
agenda/social-security-and-health-care-entitlement-reform; Robert 
Greenstein et al., Would an Entitlement Cap Be a Wise Idea, CTR. ON BUDGET 
& POL’Y PRIORITIES (Mar. 2, 2005), https://www.cbpp.org/research/would-an-
entitlement-cap-be-a-wise-idea; David Stuart Koitz, The Entitlements Debate, 
EVERYCRSREPORT (Jan. 28, 1998), https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/97-
39.html. 
117. See Christine Eibner & Sarah Nowak, The Effect of Eliminating the 
Individual Mandate Penalty and the Role of Behavioral Factors, 
COMMONWEALTH FUND (July 11, 2018), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/fund-
reports/2018/jul/eliminating-individual-mandate-penalty-behavioral-factors. 
118. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
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when the Supreme Court was again asked to consider whether 
the ACA was unconstitutional because a Congress, later from 
the one that passed the Act, had decided to remove the mandate 
provision that provided financial support and served as the Act’s 
enforcement mechanism.119  That provision had required 
everyone who could afford to buy health insurance to either have 
health insurance or pay a fine.120  Previously, the Court had 
twice found the Act to be constitutional on other challenges.121  
So how should this new problem be looked at?  As arguments 
both for and against the constitutionality of the Act are currently 
before the Court, I will limit my remarks here to what I had said 
about the proper constitutional standing of prior cases on 
entitlement programs such as the ACA.122 
When Congress and the president approve an entitlement 
program, designed to ensure health care as a human right and 
make it available to all who want it, but a later Congress does 
not provide adequate funding or removes the funding provision 
they had been previously provided, the Act legally continues to 
exist, although it may not be fully enforceable.  This is because 
Congress, either the present or a future Congress, can easily 
step back into the arena and provide the necessary funding by 
whatever constitutionally accepted method it chooses or, 
otherwise, fully repeal the law.  In other words, absent other 
constitutional problems, as long as the Act remains on the books, 
it should be afforded as much respect as possible to safeguard 
the democratic process the Constitution has set up.  Here the 
prior precedents are operating but only to limit the Court from 
overstepping into the domain that the Constitution has set for 
 
119. See Texas v. California, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 
140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020) (No. 19-1019). 
120. See RYAN J. ROSSO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44438, THE INDIVIDUAL 
MANDATE FOR HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: IN BRIEF (updated 2020). 
121. See Zach Buck, While the Supreme Court Deliberates on the 
Affordable Care Act, Congress and the White House May Act, CONVERSATION 
(Nov. 12, 2020), https://theconversation.com/while-the-supreme-court-
deliberates-on-the-affordable-care-act-congress-and-the-white-house-may-act-
149891; Valarie Blake, The Constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act: An 
Update, AMA J. ETHICS (Nov. 2012), https://journalofethics.ama-
assn.org/article/constitutionality-affordable-care-act-update/2012-11. 
122. On June 18, 2021, the Supreme Court left in place the Affordable 
Care Act finding the petitioners (states) did not suffer a direct injury that 
would have provided them Article III standing to bring the case.  California v. 
Texas, No. 19-840, slip op. (U.S. June 17, 2021). 
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Congress. 
VI.  ABORTION, SODOMY, AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
 
This section will discuss three precedents where it has been 
suggested the Court may undermine certain basic human rights 
by overruling past precedents.123  One set of cases is also 
presented to show when the Court did overrule a past 
precedent—where the effect of its choice was actually to secure 
a human right that should now receive strong protection. 
     a.  Abortion 
 
Following President Trump’s nomination and the Senate’s 
confirmation of Amy Coney Barrett as his third appointed 
Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court, concerns were raised over 
whether Roe v. Wade, the case recognizing a woman’s 
constitutional privacy right to decide whether or not to continue 
a pregnancy before viability, would continue to be affirmed or 
whether the Court might soon overrule it.124  The question arises 
because now at least five of the nine members of the Court tend 
to follow a conservative approach of deciding constitutional cases 
based on what they believe the framers would have intended 
when they wrote the Constitution.125  It also is particularly 
poignant because President Trump has said, on more than one 
occasion, he prefers to appoint Justices who believe human life 
begins at conception.126  With various states passing laws 
limiting a woman’s access to an abortion, it is likely a case 
 
123. See Tom McCarthy, Justice Alito Takes Aim at Abortion Rights, Gay 
Marriage and Covid Rules, GUARDIAN (Nov. 13, 2020, 12:47 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2020/nov/13/justice-samuel-alito-supreme-
court-liberty. 
124. See Adam Liptak, Barrett’s Record: A Conservative Who Would Push 
the Supreme Court to the Right, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/article/amy-barrett-views-issues.html. 
125. See Sarah McCammon, A Look At Amy Coney Barrett’s Record On 
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concerning overturning the Roe holding will reach the Supreme 
Court in the next year.127  Obviously, if the Roe holding were 
deemed a super-precedent, its continued status in the law would 
be difficult to overturn.  Should Roe be treated as a normal 
Supreme Court precedent, then its survival, given the current 
makeup of the Court, is questionable.  Justice Clarence Thomas 
has written in other cases that attempted to limit Roe’s viability 
that he favors overturning Roe.128  This question will likely 
remain a serious concern in the background as new cases find 
their way to the Court.129  While there may be alternative means 
to limit any harm that might result, provided the Congress and 
president would go along, what could be the effect of overturning 
Roe itself?130 
When Roe was decided, the Court also decided how it would 
delineate when the state’s interest in protecting prenatal life 
would begin and the woman’s interest in terminating a 
pregnancy, except to save her own life, would end.  Roe 
addressed that issue with the trimester system in which in the 
first and second trimesters, the decision was the woman’s, in 
consultation with her physician.131  At the end of the first 
trimester, the state may regulate abortions, but only to protect 
maternal health.132  Only at the beginning of the third trimester, 
the point where it is believed the fetus could survive as an 
independent being outside the womb, does the state’s interest in 
preserving prenatal life become compelling.133  This system 
would continue for a number of years against various challenges 
 
127. Id.; see, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Hear Abortion Case 
Challenging Roe v. Wade, NY TIMES (May 17, 2021), 
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https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/issue-brief/abortion-at-scotus-a-
review-of-potential-cases-this-term-and-possible-rulings/. 
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in part because Roe’s holding, recognizing the woman’s right of 
choice to bear and beget a pregnancy was thought to be 
fundamental, warranting strict scrutiny by the Court of any 
efforts by the government to interfere with the right.134  That 
approach, however, would change in 1992 when the Court, in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
reaffirmed its earlier decision in Roe but limited their affirmance 
to apply only to Roe’s central holding regarding a woman’s right 
to have an abortion prior to viability.135  Beyond that, the Court 
in Casey severed the trimester system as nonessential to Roe’s 
central holding and replaced Roe’s requirement that strict 
scrutiny be applied with an “undue burden” test that would 
allow the states some restrictions on access to abortions provided 
they did not fully undermine a woman’s right to an abortion with 
burdensome prevention tactics.136 
Now, it is held that the state’s interest in protecting fetal 
life, as set out in the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Law,137 may 
begin at conception, although the state’s expression of its 
interest cannot place an undue burden on the woman’s right to 
choose.138  States like Pennsylvania could constitutionally 
mandate, as it did, that the woman considering having an 
abortion be required to wait twenty-four hours before making 
her decision based on the state’s preference for life.139 
Additionally, these states could mandate that parental approval 
would be necessary if the woman was a minor, although the child 
could seek a judicial bypass to prevent significant threats 
against her.140  In Casey, the only restriction not allowed was the 
requirement that the woman inform her husband, as this might 
lead to serious physical harm directed at the woman.141  Thus, 
while on the one hand Casey reaffirmed Roe, on the other hand, 
it loosened the degree of protection Roe had afforded women in 
 
134. See Vincent J. Samar, Personhood Under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 287, 289–302 (2017) (discussing the 
background of the abortion debate). 
135. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). 
136. Id. at 878. 
137. See Abortion Control Act, 18 PA STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3203–
3220 (West 1992). 
138. Casey, 505 U.S. at 872–73. 
139. Id. at 884–885. 
140. Id. at 899. 
141. Id. at 893–94. 
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accessing abortions.  Looking to the future and the current 
membership of the Court, it is by no means out of the question 
that Roe could be overruled. 
Still, having said that overruling Roe is not out of the 
question does not mean Roe ought to be overruled.  While there 
may have been some concerns expressed as to Roe’s original 
timetable for when a state could prohibit an abortion, no serious 
challenge on this point was ever made, and it is unlikely it would 
be made absent the creation of a totally artificial womb which 
would certainly mean that the fetus was not living on its own.  
So, the Roe trimester system was not unworkable, even if its 
alleged rigidity may have undermined states from expressing 
their desire to protect a fetus’s life before viability.142  More 
importantly for preserving Roe’s central holding was Justice 
O’Connor’s acknowledgement of how women in society had come 
to rely on the holding. 
 
To eliminate the issue of reliance that easily, 
however, one would need to limit cognizable 
reliance to specific instances of sexual activity. 
But to do this would be simply to refuse to face the 
fact that for two decades of economic and social 
developments, people have organized intimate 
relationships and made choices that define their 
views of themselves and their places in society, in 
reliance on the availability of abortion in the event 
that contraception should fail. The ability of 
women to participate equally in the economic and 
social life of the Nation has been facilitated by 
their ability to control their reproductive lives. 
The Constitution serves human values, and while 
the effect of reliance on Roe cannot be exactly 
measured, neither can the certain cost of 
overruling Roe for people who have ordered their 
thinking and living around that case be 
dismissed.143 
 
Justice O’Connor then goes on to say how well the Roe decision 
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143. Id. at 856 (citation omitted). 
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was able to operate without disturbance in two lines of cases in 
which it had application. 
 
It will be recognized, of course, that Roe stands at 
an intersection of two lines of decisions, but in 
whichever doctrinal category one reads the case, 
the result for present purposes will be the same. 
The Roe Court itself placed its holding in the 
succession of cases most prominently exemplified 
by Griswold v. Connecticut. When it is so seen, Roe 
is clearly in no jeopardy, since subsequent 
constitutional developments have neither 
disturbed, nor do they threaten to diminish, the 
scope of recognized protection accorded to the 
liberty relating to intimate relationships, the 
family, and decisions about whether or not to 
beget or bear a child.  Roe, however, may be seen 
not only as an exemplar of Griswold liberty but as 
a rule (whether or not mistaken) of personal 
autonomy and bodily integrity, with doctrinal 
affinity to cases recognizing limits on 
governmental power to mandate medical 
treatment or to bar its rejection. If so, our cases 
since Roe accord with Roe’s view that a State’s 
interest in the protection of life falls short of 
justifying any plenary override of individual 
liberty claims.144 
 
Justice O’Connor’s analysis here was crucial to the Casey 
decision to uphold Roe’s essential holding. To elaborate, it was 
crucial because it spoke to the important role the Court assigns 
the practical and prudential criteria when deciding whether or 
not to overrule a case that a significant number of people found 
to be contrary to their comprehensive religious, moral, and 
metaphysical beliefs.  It also shows the importance of the criteria 
the Court relied upon in its examination of the fallout that would 
likely occur if Roe were overruled.  At this point, I would like to 
go beyond what the Casey Court held to note the importance of 
my additional criterion in establishing that Casey was right, and 
 
144. Id. at 857 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). 
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that the essential holding of Roe should continue into the future. 
Remember my added criterion would ask whether 
upholding Roe was essential to protecting human rights, 
specifically the human rights of women.  Here, we need to ask 
who else may have implicated rights.  These could include the 
father’s rights, as well as the rights of the fetus.  With regard to 
any rights claimed by the father, there is certainly an interest 
because the fetus was the result of his sperm that would now be 
destroyed.  But that interest is pretty far removed from his 
current involvement, because after being placed in the mother, 
it has no direct connection with the father but is wholly 
dependent for its life and continued existence on the mother’s 
body and her choices.  So, one would be hard pressed to find 
much of an interest of the father from having placed his sperm 
in the mother to override the mother’s interest in discontinuing 
the pregnancy early.  Obviously, his interest will become more 
apparent and significant if the mother gives birth to a child, but 
that is a future interest rather than a present interest. 
As to a possible interest of the fetus, both the writings of 
Alan Gewirth and myself should offer some needed direction.  
Gewirth notes that the PGC, when combined with a Principle of 
Proportionality, makes clear why “the fetus, while of course 
having no right to freedom, have such right to well-being as is 
required for developing its potentialities to purpose-
fulfillment.”145  However, this latter right will not be of the same 
degree as the mother’s rights given that the fetus is not a full-
fledged agent. 
 
When there is a conflict, however, the mother’s 
generic rights should take priority.  The Principle 
of Proportionality together with the PGC makes 
clear why this is so.  The justifying criterion for 
having the generic rights is that one is a 
prospective agent who has purposes he wants to 
fulfill.  When someone is less than a full-fledged 
prospective agent, his generic rights are 
proportional to the degree he approaches having 
the generic abilities constitutive of such agency, 
and the reason for this proportionality is found in 
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the relation between having the rights and having 
the generic abilities required for acting with a 
view to purpose-fulfillment. The fetus, of course, 
lacks the abilities except in remotely potential 
form.  In addition, it also lacks any purposes of 
even the most rudimentary sort, because of its 
lack of any physically separate existence and of 
even an initial acquisition of memories.  Hence, its 
generic rights by comparison with the rights of the 
mother, are minimal.146 
 
Gewirth goes on to explain that the fetus’s stage of 
development should give pause to the mother to have a stronger 
reason for terminating a later term pregnancy than an earlier 
one, but that in any case, such a pause should never be used to 
threaten “the mother’s physical, psychological, or social 
circumstances.”147  And the state should never be the one 
assessing her interest, at least not before viability as it is her 
interest that is dominant.  Additionally, Gewirth notes that any 
decision “for the fetus’s right to life be matched by concern for its 
right to adequate nutrition and other components of basic well-
being.”148  This would, of course, be a legislative matter.  Still, it 
imposes an obligation on the part of the state; if it wishes to 
promote prenatal life, it must ensure availability of the 
resources to further its own purposive goal. 
In a recent article in the Marquette Law Review, I argue that 
moral agency is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
fetus to be considered a person.  That proving such agency would 
require “a test of reasonable objectivity as would be required to 
establish the desired protection [under the Fourteenth 
Amendment] in a pluralistic society.”149  Such a test would 
obviously be connected to at least a minimal degree of conscious 
autonomous action.  I note, following the approach of Gewirth, 
that the fetus cannot pass such a test, certainly not at an early 
stage of the pregnancy, as it certainly has no purposes of its own.  
Yet, absent such a test, all we are left with is a fight among 
different comprehensive religious, moral, and metaphysical 
 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 144. 
148. Id. 
149. Samar, supra note 134, at 331. 
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doctrines over whether the fetus should or should not be 
considered a person. There is no similar dispute over whether 
the pregnant woman is a moral agent.  Talk about life in the 
abstract, natural law, or God’s will only serves to distract from 
the fundamental question of whether, in a pluralistic society 
holding many different and inconsistent comprehensive 
doctrines, the Court can take a side in what might be best 
termed a religious fight where fundamental human rights of the 
woman could end up being nullified.  Justice Blackmun in his 
majority opinion in Roe made this clear when he opined that the 
Court, under the Fourteenth Amendment, had never recognized 
the fetus as a person.150  Thus, the decision is properly left up to 
the woman to decide in conformity with her own conscience and 
comprehensive doctrines what she believes.  “[I]f the different 
positions [regarding the fetus’ status and whether human life 
itself should be thought sacred] are to be reconciled, clarity of 
both the language used and justifications for the assumptions 
made is essential.”151  Not providing such clarity and 
justifications, because the Court is asked to recognize certain 
comprehensive doctrines that cannot be fully justified, is to leave 
the Court and women everywhere in the United States at the 
behest of those in power.  Thus, the essential holding of Roe v. 
Wade that women have a right to choose abortion prior to a fetus 
becoming viable should continue as a super-precedent. 
     b.  Sodomy 
 
Michael Hardwick, a bartender at a gay bar in Atlanta, was 
issued a citation by a passing police officer for violating a local 
ordinance prohibiting public drinking after he tossed an empty 
bottle into a trashcan immediately outside the bar.152  The 
citation had a date for Michael to pay the fine or appear in court; 
however, because of a clerical error, a different date appeared on 
the court calendar.153 An arrest warrant was issued for Michael’s 
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failure to pay the requisite fine or appear in court.154  The 
warrant was invalid as Michael had actually paid the fine.155  
After Michael failed to appear on the calendar date, the officer 
acted on the arrest warrant and went to Michael’s home.156  The 
officer then went upstairs to Michael’s bedroom where he 
witnessed Michael and another man engaged in sex acts.157  The 
officer then arrested Michael for violating Georgia’s sodomy 
law.158  In response, Michael brought suit in federal court 
“challenging the constitutionality of the state statute insofar as 
it criminalized consensual sodomy” performed in private. 159  
After the district court dismissed the case, the Eleventh Circuit 
in a divided opinion reversed, remanding the case for trial on 
whether the state could show a compelling interest narrowly 
drawn for the prohibition.  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to resolve the issue after other Courts of Appeal had 
decided the issue contrary to the way the Eleventh Circuit 
decided it.160 
Early in the case, the Court stated the issue as “whether the 
Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon 
homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the 
laws of the many States that still make such conduct illegal and 
have done so for a very long time.”161  The majority opinion, 
written by Justice White, goes on to disagree with the Court of 
Appeals that its prior case law confers such a right.162  It then 
discusses the test for recognition of fundamental rights to be 
either (a) “those that are ‘implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty’”163 or (b) “are ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition.’”164  The Court then holds, “[i]t is obvious to us that 
neither of these formulations would extend a fundamental right 
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effect, the Court found that there was no constitutional 
protection for the behavior in which Michael Hardwick was 
involved.  In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger further 
writes, “[t]o hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow 
protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside 
millennia of moral teaching.”166  However, there was an 
important dissent by Justice Stevens that would become the 
controlling law in this area seventeen years later.  Justice 
Stevens wrote: 
 
Our prior cases make two propositions 
abundantly clear.  First, the fact that the 
governing majority in a State has traditionally 
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not 
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting 
the practice; neither history nor tradition could 
save a law prohibiting miscegenation from 
constitutional attack.  Second, individual 
decisions by married persons, concerning the 
intimacies of their physical relationship, even 
when not intended to produce offspring, are a form 
of “liberty” protected by the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.167 
 
The argument at the Court was not unfamiliar.  Nor did the 
Court attempt to justify its position by claiming the law was 
necessary to support the freedom or well-being of the people.  If 
anything, the Court clearly expressed disinterest in this concern.  
Instead, what the Court did was follow a now infamous 
argument by Lord Patrick Devlin in his response to the 1957 
Wolfenden Report which recommended decriminalization of 
same-sex consensual conduct in England.168  There, Devlin 
wrote: 
 
166. Id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
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[A]n established morality is as necessary as good 
government to the welfare of society.  Societies 
disintegrate from within more frequently than 
they are broken up by external pressures.  . . .. The 
suppression of vice is as much the law’s business 
as the suppression of subversive activities, it is no 
more possible to define a sphere of private 
morality than it is to define one of private 
subversive activity.169 
 
Lord Devlin’s argument was met by a response at the time 
from H.L.A. Hart, a highly influential Anglo-American legal 
philosopher.  Hart’s response, which would later be reflected in 
Justice Stevens’s dissent in Bowers and become part of the 
majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas,170 argued: 
 
No doubt we would all agree that a consensus of 
moral opinion on certain matters is essential if 
society is to be worth living in.  Laws against 
murder, theft, and much else would be of little use 
if they were not supported by a widely diffuse 
conviction that what those laws forbid is also 
immoral.  So much is obvious.  But it does not 
follow that everything to which the moral vetoes 
of accepted morality attach is of equal importance 
to society; nor is there the slightest reason for 
thinking of morality as a seamless web. . . ..  First, 
we must ask whether a practice which offends 
moral feeling is harmful independently of its 
repercussion on the general moral code.  Secondly, 
what about repercussion on the moral code?  Is it 
really true that failure to translate this item of 
general morality into criminal law will jeopardize 
the whole fabric of morality and so society?171 
 
Hart’s argument and the Wolfenden Report were influential 
 
169. PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 13 (1965). 
170. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003). 
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on the development of the American Model Penal Code in 
1980.172  That Code excluded penal sanctions for nontraditional 
sexual practices by married couples and unmarried couples.173  
It also recommended removal of the crime of consensual sodomy 
in private as applied to homosexuals.174  The authors of the 
Model Penal Code noted, “[i]n the words of the Wolfenden 
Report, the decisive factor favoring decriminalization of the laws 
against private homosexual relations between consenting adults 
‘is the importance which society and the law ought to give 
individual freedom of choice and action in private matters.’”175 
Lawrence v. Texas would be the case that ended state 
proscriptions against private consensual homosexual conduct 
among consenting adults.  In that case, Harris County, Texas 
police officers responding to a call of a weapons disturbance 
observed Lawrence and another man engaged in anal sex in 
Lawrence’s home.176  The couple were arrested and charged with 
violating a Texas statute prohibiting “deviate sexual 
intercourse,” which is defined to include “any contact between 
any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of 
another person.”177  The case was certified to the U.S. Supreme 
Court on three separate questions: 
 
Whether petitioners’ criminal convictions under 
the Texas ‘Homosexual Conduct’ law—which 
criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, 
but not identical behavior by different-sex 
couples—violate the Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantee of equal protection of the laws. 
Whether petitioners’ criminal convictions for 
adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home 
violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Whether Bowers v. Hardwick should . . . be 
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overruled?178 
 
In deciding to strike as unconstitutional the Texas statute 
and overrule its prior decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court, 
per the opinion by Justice Kennedy, stated: “When sexuality 
finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, 
the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is 
more enduring.”179  This is important because contrary to the 
way the Court in Bowers had phrased the issue, “whether the 
Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon 
homosexuals to engage in sodomy,” Justice Kennedy’s opinion in 
Lawrence began by noting that “[t]he question before the Court 
is the validity of a Texas statute making it a crime for two 
persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual 
conduct.”180  The change in language bespoke a change in not 
only tone but direction as to how this case would unfold.  Now 
the issue was one about intimate contact which, when 
consensual, represents an ideal case example of a private act, 
because clearly no other interests are involved.181 
Kennedy went on to write, “[t]he liberty protected by the 
Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this 
choice.”182  The Court noted that laws prohibiting sodomy have 
not generally been enforced,183 that the Model Penal Code had 
made clear it did not recommend continuation of such laws,184 in 
England the British Parliament had ten years earlier adopted 
the recommendation of the Wolfenden Report,185 and that by the 
time the Bowers Court rendered its decision, the European 
Court of Human Rights, on a similar issue, had ruled in Dudgeon 
v. United Kingdom that North Ireland’s proscription of sodomy 
violated the European Convention on Human Rights.186 
One other point is worth noting.  The Court chose not to 
address the issue under the equal protection clause but rather 
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under due process as it previously had done in Bowers.  Noting 
that its earlier decision in Bowers led to discrimination in other 
areas, it feared only addressing the issue as an equal protection 
concern would allow states to continue making certain 
nonprocreative forms of sexual conduct criminal (which would 
also likely have a disparate impact on gay people), provided the 
conduct was prohibited for both opposite as well as same-sex 
couples.187  In particular, the Court drew attention to an earlier 
case in which it had struck down as a violation of equal 
protection Colorado’s attempt to restrict, by way of a state 
constitutional amendment, any effort to legislatively protect 
homosexuals, as a class, from discrimination for reasons of 
animus.188 As a consequence, it would now make use of due 
process to correct its earlier wrong in a way that it hoped would 
also avoid future discrimination.  As Kennedy stated: 
 
Equality of treatment and the due process right to 
demand respect for conduct protected by the 
substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in 
important respects, and a decision on the latter 
point advances both interests. If protected 
conduct is made criminal and the law which does 
so remains unexamined for its substantive 
validity, its stigma might remain even if it were 
not enforceable as drawn for equal protection 
reasons. When homosexual conduct is made 
criminal by the law of the State, that declaration 
in and of itself is an invitation to subject 
homosexual persons to discrimination both in the 
public and in the private spheres. The central 
holding of Bowers has been brought in question by 
this case, and it should be addressed. Its 
continuance as precedent demeans the lives of 
homosexual persons.189 
 
Part of the ground for the Court’s mixing of equality of 
treatment with due process was based on a recognition it 
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attributed to its earlier decision in Casey that “matters, 
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may 
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and 
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”190 
From these arguments, it was a straightforward move for 
the Court to find that “[t]he rationale of Bowers does not 
withstand careful analysis.”191  It found that Justice Stevens’s 
analysis in Bowers should have controlled in that case, “and 
should control here.”192  “Bowers was not correct when it was 
decided, and it is not correct today.  It ought not to remain 
binding precedent.  Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is 
overruled.”193 
What is also interesting to note by the Court’s overruling of 
Bowers is that contrary to what was decided in Casey, no 
reliance interests in favor of protected rights would be offset.  If 
anything, a lack of such reliance interests giving rise to fear of 
prosecution and affording a justification for discrimination 
would now be ended.  This gave the case a focus on human 
dignity in which basic rights are presumably invested to 
protect.194  If that is the case, then the kind of fundamental 
protection of freedom and well-being the case provided, which is 
most central to individual autonomy because no one else’s basic 
interest was involved, is the very kind of reason that should 
shore up the Court’s decision in Lawrence as a super-precedent 
capable of withstanding the breath of time. 
Lastly, in looking at what constitutes ordered liberty or 
what may have deep roots in the nation’s history and tradition, 
equal protection concerns need to be considered to inform 
whether past prejudice and bias, and not a true liberty interest, 
was what was being previously secured.  The Bowers Court, 
unattenuated by equal protection concerns, treated history and 
tradition to avoid any claim that intimate consensual sexual 
relations among consenting adults could ever qualify as a 
 
190. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
851 (1992)). 
191. Id. at 577. 
192. Id. at 578. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 578; see also Samar, supra note 16, at 141–44 (arguing that 
human dignity supervenes on the recognition of human rights). 
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fundamental right.  Overruling Bowers v. Hardwick allowed 
recognition of this fundamental basic right. 
     c.  Same-Sex Marriage 
 
Interestingly, it was Justice Scalia, in his dissent in 
Lawrence v. Texas, who pointed out the likelihood of a case 
coming forth to recognize same-sex marriage in the near future.  
At the end of its opinion—after having laid waste the 
foundations of our rational-basis jurisprudence—the Court says 
that the present case “does not involve whether the government 
must give formal recognition to any relationship that 
homosexual persons seek to enter.”195 
 
Do not believe it. . . . Today’s opinion dismantles 
the structure of constitutional law that has 
permitted a distinction to be made between 
heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as 
formal recognition in marriage is concerned.  If 
moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is ‘no 
legitimate state interest’ for purposes of 
proscribing that conduct, and if, as the Court coos 
(casting aside all pretense of neutrality), ‘[w]hen 
sexuality finds overt expression in intimate 
conduct with another person, the conduct can be 
one element in a personal bond that is more 
enduring,’ what justification could there possibly 
be for denying the benefits of marriage to 
homosexual couples exercising ‘[t]he liberty 
protected by the Constitution?’196 
 
Justice Scalia’s prediction was on the mark, although 
obviously he was not pleased to express it because he would 
dissent from the Court’s later recognition of same-sex intimacy 
as a liberty interest protected by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in Obergefell v. Hodges.197 
 
       195.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
196. Id. at 604–605 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
197. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). 
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In Obergefell, same-sex couples from four states: Michigan, 
Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee had sought the right to marry, 
although the law of these states had defined “marriage as a 
union between one man and one woman.”  After winning in the 
district courts, the states appealed, and the Sixth Circuit 
reversed.198  The questions before the Supreme Court were first, 
“whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license 
a marriage between two people of the same sex,” and second, 
“whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to 
recognize a same-sex marriage licensed and performed in a State 
which does grant that right.”199  The second question may be 
resolved without additional argument if the first question gets 
answered favorably. 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, began the opinion 
by stating that the Court “has long held the right to marry is 
protected by the Constitution.”200  He then further identified 
four principles and traditions that demonstrated the right to 
marry was a fundamental right.201  First, he noted that the right 
to marry was “inherent in the concept of individual 
autonomy.”202  Second, the Court stated that “the right to marry 
is fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike 
any other in its importance to the committed individuals.”203  A 
third basis for believing the right to marry is fundamental is that 
 
198. Id. at 653–54. 
199. Id. at 656; see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit 
shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial 
Proceedings of every other State.  And the Congress may by general Laws 
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be 
proved, and the Effect thereof.”).  The last phrase of the Full Faith and Credit 
clause, allowing Congress to proscribe the “Effect thereof,” gave it, in the 
Defense of Marriage Act, authority to allow states that banned same-sex 
marriage to not have to recognize an out-of-state same-sex marriage that was 
legal where it was performed.  Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No 104–199, 
110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. §7 (1997), 28 U.S.C. 
§1738C (1997). 
200. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 664 (2015).  In support of this proposition, the 
Court cited Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), which invalidated bans 
on interracial unions, a unanimous Court held marriage is “one of the vital 
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”  The 
Court also citied Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1988), which held the 
right to marry was burdened by a law prohibiting fathers who were behind on 
child support from marrying.  Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 664. 
201. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 665–69. 
202. Id. at 665. 
203. Id. at 666. 
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it “safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning 
from related rights of childbearing, procreation, and 
education.”204  “Without the recognition, stability, and 
predictability marriage offers, [the children of homosexual 
couples] suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow 
lesser.”205  Finally, the Court stated that its “cases and the 
Nation’s traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of our 
social order.”206  From this vantage point of seeing marriage as 
a fundamental right under the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Kennedy went on to reason: 
 
There is no difference between same- and 
opposite-sex couples with respect to this principle.  
Yet by virtue of their exclusion from that 
institution, same-sex couples are denied the 
constellation of benefits that the States have 
linked to marriage.  This harm results in more 
than just material burdens.  Same-sex couples are 
consigned to an instability many opposite-sex 
couples would deem intolerable in their own lives.  
As the State itself makes marriage all the more 
precious by the significance it attaches to it, 
exclusion from that status has the effect of 
teaching that gays and lesbians are unequal in 
important respects.207 
 
Here, it is important to see how Justice Kennedy is using an 
equal protection analysis to shore-up a due process analysis that 
would place same-sex marriage within the fundamental 
framework that opposite-sex marriage already occupies.  What 
Justice Kennedy wanted to avoid were past practices that may 
harbor forms of prejudice making it impossible for new groups 
to enjoy the benefits of what had been previously recognized.  
The approach of merely looking to what may have been 
recognized in the Nation’s long-standing traditions would thus 
not be enough, “[i]f rights were defined by who exercised them 
 
204. Id. at 667. 
205. Id. at 668. 
206. Id. at 669. 
207. Id. at 670. 
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in the past, [because] then received practices could serve as their 
own continued justification and new groups could not invoke 
rights once denied.”208  In essence, what Kennedy and the 
majority were acknowledging was a role for equal protection to 
inform due process and vice versa, even when the case was being 
decided primarily as a due process case.  Kennedy writes: 
 
The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection 
Clause are connected in a profound way, though 
they set forth independent principles.  Rights 
implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal 
protection may rest on different precepts and are 
not always coextensive, yet in some instances they 
may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of 
the other.  In any particular case one Clause may 
be thought to capture the essence of the right in a 
more accurate and comprehensive way, even as 
the two Clauses may converge in the identification 
and definition of the right.209 
 
With this instruction in mind, the Court would go on to hold 
that “same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to 
marry.  No longer may this liberty be denied to them.”210  State 
laws which exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage by, e.g., 
defining marriage only between opposite sex are now invalid.  It 
should be noted that in arriving at this holding, the Court 
overruled an earlier precedent that had dismissed a same-sex 
marriage challenge against the state of Minnesota “for want of a 
substantial federal question.”211 
Beyond its obvious significance as a fundamental human 
rights case, Obergefell is important because it shows that liberty 
and equality are not totally independent, nor are they totally 
 
208. Id. at 671 (distinguishing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 
(1997), calling “for a ‘careful description’ of fundamental rights,” noting “while 
that approach may have been appropriate for the asserted right there involved 
(physician-assisted suicide), it is inconsistent with the approach this Court has 
used in discussing other fundamental rights, including marriage and 
intimacy”). 
209. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 672. 
210. Id. at 675. 
211. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1971), overruled by Obergefell, 576 
U.S. 644 (2015). 
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opposite.  To have freedom, one needs well-being and the 
equality associated with it.  This is true whether the freedom is 
achieved by virtue of one’s status (as with marriage now being 
available to either same or opposite sex couples) or because the 
law assigns benefits based on status.  But this also means that 
if the law is going to require a certain status to access a 
fundamental right, it is equally necessary that different groups 
should have access to that status and not be defined out of it, 
absent a compelling state interest to the contrary.  Put another 
way, the well-being that provides the anchor for equal treatment 
must include a principle of equality to ensure equal access to 
liberty.  Marriage is one such example of a fundamental basic 
right.  What had begun in Lawrence v. Texas as a way for liberty 
and equality to work together should now become a pillar of 
constitutional interpretation going forward, as it was in 
Obergefell v. Hodges.  Thus, the freedom that longstanding 
rights represent, and which was acknowledged in Obergefell 
with regard to marriage, should continue into the future, and 
not be limited by past bias, even less by prejudice against any 
particular group, but be available to all persons for whom this 
right would be fundamental.  The Court’s holding in Obergefell 
affirms the human rights proposition that human dignity comes 
about only when individual freedom, especially when closely 
connected to individual well-being, is not sacrificed to less than 
the most compelling of concerns.212  Obergefell is for these 
reasons truly a super-precedent. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
This article has sought to answer the stare decisis question 
of how to rank precedents to certify those cases which should be 
recognized to have long-lasting effect against other precedents.  
I have argued that the standard approaches of looking to 
acceptance, workability, reliance, and the ability to fit with other 
 
212. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 675 (“Especially against a long history of 
disapproval of their relationships, this denial to same-sex couples of the right 
to marry works a grave and continuing harm. The imposition of this disability 
on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and subordinate them. And the Equal 
Protection Clause, like the Due Process Clause, prohibits this unjustified 
infringement of the fundamental right to marry.”). 
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precedents may be jointly helpful, even necessary, but not 
sufficient to ensure that human rights are being protected.  
People and politicians can often vary, if not alter, their views on 
the salience of past precedents, even when they appear to be of 
the greatest importance to other peoples’ individual freedom and 
well-being, let alone their dignity.  Therefore, more than mere 
acceptance is especially required. 
I have argued, in addition to respecting the standard 
criteria for precedents, that an additional criterion be 
considered, which focuses specifically on human freedom and 
well-being.  This additional criterion is necessary to protect the 
most basic liberties people have by virtue of being persons or 
human agents.  Thus, it should be in terms of this additional 
criterion that any precedent likely to affect human dignity be 
examined to see if it actually services that need.  The right of a 
woman to choose whether to continue a pregnancy prior to the 
fetus’ viability, the right of any person to engage in private adult 
consensual intimate contact with another, and the right of two 
people of the same sex to marry are just three examples of recent 
cases worthy of being labeled super-precedents.  Stare decisis 
needs to acknowledge and pay attention to these and other 
similar cases because they further the freedom and well-being 
that are associated with our most basic liberties and human 
dignity. 
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